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JUDICIAL CONTROL OF THE MISSOURI
PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION
(Concluded)
GENERAL REGULATION OF UTILITIES
The remaining cases in which orders of the Commission have been reviewed by the courts may be treated together under one heading, since they
are not numerous. The Act deals with utilities in three groups, but most of
these cases below have to do with the railroad group.
1. Miscellaneous Service Charges
The two following cases involve service charges and have some relation
to the rate cases. Certain statutes passed long prior to the Act provided that
railroads must provide "team tracks" on which cars might be placed while
being loaded and unloaded, and further provided that if a car was so placed,
and was detained beyond a certain time, the railroad might charge demurrage
for the delay.,3 The Kansas City Southern Railway"4 made an ingenious
attempt to get more revenue by filing with the Commission a schedule of
"track storage", charges for delay in loading and unloading cars beyond a fixed
period. It contended that these were charges for the use of the tracks on which
the car stood while being unloaded, a sort of track rental, and therefore not
inconsistent with the demurrage charges provided by the statute. The Commission permanently suspended the schedule and the supreme court affirmed
this order, on the ground the statutory demurrage charges were necessarily
intended to cover the whole matter. Presumably had the railroad asked the
Commission to fix higher demurrage rates, then, had it desired, it could have
done so under Rhodes v. P. S. C.11
In the next case a travelling salesman complained of the baggage storage
charges (which were the same in force throughout the whole country). The
railroad could charge for Sundays and holidays, and, when a salesman arrived
in a town Friday evening or Saturday, he was often unable to see his customers
until Monday, and had to pay storage on his baggage. The sympathetic Commission, after a hearing, made an order redressing the grievance, but on ap6
peal the Supreme Court of Missouri found numerous fatal objections.11 In
the first place the order was general and affected the whole travelling public,
yet the Commission had based it only on the evidence of the salesmen alone.
Hence, there was no evidence to support such a general order. In addition, it
was discriminatory as to interstate travellers who are subject to interstate
regulations. Furthermore, if limited to salesmen, it would be a special law
.based on an unlawful classification, and therefore contrary to the constitution.
2. Power to Stop Trains
The orders appealed from, as to this subject, have all concerned interstate passenger trains. Perhaps thc pressure of public opinion on the Commission, backed as it is by local municipal pride, and by competition with or
113. R.S. 1919,§§ 9917-19.
114. Kansas City Southern Railway v. P. S. C.
(1915) 265 Mo. 399, 178 S. W. 55.

Ii5. See note 70 supra.
116. .4. T. & S. F. Ry. Co. v. P. S. C. (1917)
(Mo.) 192 S. W. 460.
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without jealousy of one or more rival municipalities, is stronger in regard to
demands for new depots, new stations, and as to stopping limited trains, than
as to any other matters within the jurisdiction of the Commission. Some of the
demands of this character, made in the utmost earnestness are so preposterous
as to be funny?. Then, too, a state agency of this sort, and even the state supreme courts are apt to have some local bias. So, we frequently find a conplete disagreement between state courts and federal courts as to the necessity
of stopping limited interstate trains. At any rate such orders of the Commission have not withstood judicial review.
Section 51 of the Act" 7 confers broad powers as to arranging train schedules and stopping trains where the Commission deems it for the public necessity and convenience. In Missouri Pacific Railroad Co v. P. S. C.1 8 an
order was entered requiring the company to stop an eastbound train regularly, and to stop on flag a westbound train at California. As to the westbound
train the company appealed, and the circuit court modified the order so as to
require it to stop only for the purpose of discharging passengers from St. Louis.
On appeal to the supreme court the order as modified was sustained. The fact
that two near-by smaller towns were flag stops for this train failed to make any
great impression in the supreme court, though 't was probably regarded as
conclusive by the citizens of California.
In M. K. T. Railway v. P. S. C.11 9 the supreme court did affirm an order of
the Commission requiring an interstate train in each direction, to stop on flag
at Pilot Grove, to discharge or take on certain classes of passengers, the ground
of the decision being that the preponderance of the evidence supported a
finding of public necessity and convenience. Pilot Grove was a town of about
1600, and aside from the trains in question, had but two trains per day each
way, though on the main line of the railroad. There was no appeal to the
federal Supreme Court.
In Lusk v. P.S.C.1O the order entered by the Commission was an order
directing the re-routing of two limited trains, rather than one directing stops
and most of the discussion is whether the Commission has power to re-route.
The act does not specifically confer such power. The majority of the judges of
the Supreme Court came to the conclusion that it had power tore-route, at least
to the limited extent required here, as a part of its power to arrange schedules
and order stops.Presumably the decision of the state court still stands, so
far as this construction of the act goes. The state court affirmed the order of
the Commission, two judges dissenting on the ground there was no power to
re-route. On appeal to the federal supreme court the order was reversed as an
117. R. S. § 10460. The section provides:
"the commission shall, after a hearing .......
...
have power to make an order directing ......
such railroad corporation ......
to increase the
number of its trains or of its cars or its motive
power, or to change the time for starting ...... or
to change the time schedule for the run of any
train or car, or to make any other suitable order
that the commission may determine reasonably
necessary ......
118. (1918) 273 Mo. 632, 201 S. W. 1143.
119. (1918) 277 Mo. 175,210S. W. 386.
120. (1918) 277 Mo. 264,210S. W. 72.
121. The court held that the complaint was
that the trains be required to stop as they had

formerly done. The stoppage was the principal
thing and the necessity of re-routing around the
curve was merely incidental and came within the
power of the Commission to stop trains, under
section 51. The order was that the train was to
stop at Caruthersville and the problem of getting
it there was for the railroad to solve. The extra
distance here was about ten miles. One wonders if
it were fifty miles whether it would still be a mere
order to stop, if in fact the particular train had
stopped formerly at a particular place.
The
argument by which the court decides the rerouting question is merely incidental and is not
impressive.
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unlawful interference with interstate commerce. 1 2 The case must have caused
some excitement locally while pending, and it may well be that even the state
supreme court was in some measure influenced by what at times have been
called "fireside equities". It seemed that the railroad had played a rather
scurvy trick on a trusting community, and a bitter local rival-due to advantageous location, was reaping the benefits. The city of Caruthersville was a
town of about 5,000 people located near the Mississippi River on the line of
the railroad which extends from St. Louis to Memphis. The road made a big
bend in order to reach the town, and about nine years previously a cut off had
been constructed, on pretense it was to be used for freight only, and the citizens
of the town assisted the project. But about 1913 the railroad put on two new
interstate trains which stopped at Caruthersville and re-routed its best train
each way through the cut-off.t23 The order of the Commission directed these
trains to be routed through the town, though it was ten -miles farther and
though the cost of upkeep of the track would be greater to keep it in condition
to carry fast trains. Further it appeared that the town had fourteen other
daily passenger trains. The federal court, unfeeling, so far as local issues were
concerned, could not see why fourteen trains were not sufficient for a town of
this size under the circumstances.
The same court also failed to see why two limited night trains should be
stopped at Mountain Grove, a town of about 2500 far down in the Ozarks,
when the town had four other interstate trains

daily124

The court saild:m

"Interstate commerce is concerned with the business of States distant
often from one another involving necessarily a difference in service. And
such is the character of the trains in question. They are operated in long
distance traffic, are instruments of such traffic, and it is a part of their
efficiency that they run at night."
It might be mentioned that the order in this case had been affirmed in the
state supreme court by a four to three decision.i25

Presumably Missouri is not different from other states in the degree to
which the local citizen is blinded to the larger aspects of interstate commerce.
It is difficult for him, with his pricie in his little city, to see why these heavy,
well equipped limited trains should be permitted to thunder through his com.122.

(1920) 254 U. S. 535, 65 L. Ed. 389, 41

S. C. Rep. 192.
123.
In the majority opinion it was said: "It
further appears that under the spur and lure of a
promise that it was not to lose or have interfered
with its said through day train service then
existing, Caruthersville caused to be procured the
right of way for the cut-off mentioned and its
citizens donated most of the right of way to the
railroad company." (p. 280).
"...and throughout the whole case, the pregnantfact
runs like a marking thread that for nine years after
the cut-off was built and in use, the railroad tompany itself acted on the theory that the routing of
these trains via Caruthersville was a practical railroad proposition, all of which must be held to
evidence the fact that the railroad company on its
then settled judgment deemed such running of raid
trains a necessary convenience of service andfacility
to that city and to local traffic wants."
What the courts always seem to forget. in

dealing with this class of cases is that the railroads
have been under duress in operating trains and
therefore the fact that a train has been operated
in a certain way for a long time is little evidence
of more than that it was the judgment of the
company that it had better bear the loss rather
than to rouse sleeping dogs. Railroads are still
operating a lot of trains at a loss because the
public compels them to do so. Yet it cannot be
said that that fact shows in their judgment that
such operation is a necessary convenience. It is
merely that the public insists on it, and the
public is the more powerful. At any rate, Caruthersville here saw it was soon to be on a branch line
and have branch line service, a thing calculated
to cause any live city to show fight.
124. St. Louis F.9 San Francisco Railway v.
P. S. C. (1923) 261 U. S. 369, 43 S. C. Rep. 380.
125. Page 373.
126. (1921) 290 Mo. 389, 235 S. W. 131.

JUDICIAL CONTROL OF PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION

munity without deigning to stop. Doubtless the view of the federal supreme
court is sound, for to it, the national interests are opposed in the true perspective to the local interests.
o3. Grade Crossings and other Railroad Crossings
Section 50127 of the Act gives the Commision power to prescribe the manner and terms of installation, operation, maintenance, apportionment of expenses, use and protection of crossings of railroads, street railroads and of public highways with such railroads, and also to alter, or abolish such crossings
and to require where practicable, a separation of grades at crossings already
established, and to prescribe the terms and apportion the cost of such separations between the parties concerned. Section 116128 also provides the Commission may require interlocking switches to be constructed at railroad crossings, or the establishment of other protective devices and systems of signals
at such crossings. In short the Commission is given broad powers ofcontrol over
all these crossings in the interest of public safety. A number of its orders as to
crossing devices and improvements have come before the supreme court,
usually on the matter of apportionment of the cost.
The city of Moberly, after a hearing, secured an order requiring the construction of new overhead railroad bridges at the crossing of two railroads and
a public street in that city.129 The roads involved were the Missouri Kansas
and Texas, and the Wabash. The existing bridge over the street was constructed in 1887 under a contract which provided that as to repairs and renewals
the city was to bear half the cost. The city was probably hoping to escape the
provisions of the contract, and if so, its hope was not in vain, for the Commission approved plans of the engineers of the railroads, and apportioned the
cost, about one-fourth to the city (the cost of paving the street under the
proposed bridges) and the rest to the railroads. This was approved by the
supreme court regardless of protests of the railroads that the order impaired
the obligation of the contract. The decision was based on the police power and
involved in some measure the principle involved in the franchise contract cases
above 'discussed. In this case the city got the advantage instead of the utility
as in the franchise cases.
The chief point involved in Chicago & A/ion v. P. S. C.,110 where the order
required the construction of an interlocking switch at the crossing of the above
road and the Missouri, Kansas and Texas at North Jefferson, was as to the
apportionment of cost. The order apportioned 28.6% to the Chicago and Alton
and the rest to the "Katy". There was a contract between the roads, whereby
the "Katy" had put in the crossing and it was to keep this in repair forever,
and if in the future "crossing signals and gates" should be required it was to
construct and maintain these. It was contended that the "Katy" was bound
to bear the whole cost, but the court held an interlocking switch was not included in the language of the contract and affirmed the order.
In P. S. C. v. Missouri Pacific Railroadiai it appeared that an order of
the Commission requiring an interlocking switch at the crossing of the above
railroad with the St. Louis and San Francisco, at Aurora, had been disregarded
for two years. So, the Commission brought mandamus in a circuit court
against both roads to enforce the order, and an alternative writ was granted
127.
128.

129.

R. S. 1919, § 10459.
R. S. 1919, §10527.
Missouri, Kansas and Texas Railway v.

P. S. C. (1917) 271 Mo. 270, 197 S. W. 56.
130. (1918) 275Mo. 72,204S. W. 531.
131. (1919) 280 Mo. 456, 218 S. W. 310.
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against both. Both appealed, but the important point on appeal was in connection with a contract between the roads, which provided that the cost of
any interlocking switch needed in the future was to be borne by the Missouri
Pacific. The supreme court affirmed the circuit court as to the Missouri Pacific
and reversed it as to the Frisco. It said that the latter wasnot in default,
since it was not required by the order to make any payment until thirty days
after the work was begun. Hence the question of impairment of this contract
was not involved. The order was reasonable and the switch must be constructed, and the railroads would have to fight out the contract point when it arose.
In Missouri Pacific Railroad v. P. S. C."2 it was contended by the railroads that an order was unreasonable. The Frisco had petitioped for an order
for an interlocking switch at its crossing with the Missouri Pacific at Tower
Grove, and the latter defended on the ground that it desired in the future, when
financially able, to construct a viaduct over the Frisco tracks. The Commission
held that the viaduct ought to be constructed at once, and so ordered, but it
apportioned 75% of the cost to the Missouri Pacific because the latter wanted
a double track viaduct. The railroad complained of the apportionment, but
the supreme court thought it reasonable under the circumstances.
In the remaining case we have civic pride back of a demand for a connecting interchange switch between two railroads at Macon. The Commission,
lending a sympathetic ear, ordered the switch to be constructed and the railroads appealed. A circuit court i:iffirmed the order, but the supreme court,
finding that if every car load of traffic to and from the city according to highest
estimates in evidence, were sent through this proposed switch at the regular
charge of $2 per car, it would produce an annual revenue of only $1500, while
the probable interest cost on the investment plus the annual upkeep would be
about $2,000 annually. Hence, the order was unreasonable.13 3 Of course only
a small per cent of the estimated traffic would have occasion to use the proposed switch.
4. Extensions and Additional Service
The supreme court has held that under the Act the Commission might
give a utility permission to abandon service, where service could be continued
only at a disastrous loss, even though a franchise granted by a city is on condition that service is to be continuous.131 It had previously held that a railroad
cannot abandon any part of its line without first securing permission from
the Commission.sa In the latter case a railroad had purchased the rails and
ties of two old lumber roads and had been operating some trains under contract with shippers along such tramways. In 1914 it decided to abandon the
service, but agreed with certain shippers to continue service for two years under
a contract by which it was to have a switching fee of $7.50 per car. Soon after,
one of these shippers complained to the Commission and, after a hearing, the
charge was held illegal under Art. 12, Section 12 of the constitution known as
132. (1923) 297 Mo. 622,250S. W. 595.
133. The case is C. B. & Q. Ry. v.P. S. C.
(1915) 266 Mo. 333, 181 S. W. 61. The ..bove
does not tell the whole story. It further appeared
that the switch, if constructed would h .ve a

grade such that no more than two cars could be

transferred at a time. The evidence did not in-

dicate that there would be more than a very
few cars per year which it would be convenient
to transfer at this point.
134. Southwest Missouri Railway v. P. S. C.
(1919) 281 Mo. 52, 219 S. W. 380.

135.

Missouri Southern Railway V. P. S. C.

(1919) 279 Mo. 455,214S. W.381.
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the "short haul" clause. 116 The contention that these spurs were not part of the
road's chartered lines was answered by holding that the spurs were operated by
the company within the meaning of section 16137 of the Act. As soon as this
order was entered the company announced its intention to abandon the spurs,
and the ComMission brought mandamus to compel it to continue, and a circuit court granted a peremptory writ. Appeals from this, and from the order
of the Commission holding the switching charge illegal were affirmed by the
supreme court. It was held that the company must secure permission from the
Commission to abandon, or if the rates are too low as to these spurs, it must
apply for higher rates on its lines. The constitutional provision stands in the
way of granting higher rates on these spurs than on the rest of the line.
United Railways Company v. P. S. C.138 presented the interesting question as to whether the Commission has power to order a street car company to
apply to the city for a franchise in the strqets, and then to construct tracks
therein. We have seen that under Art. 12, Section 20 of the constitution) 39 the
local authorities must consent to the use of highways by railroads and street
railroads. Section 49140 of the Act gives the Commission power to order "any
change or additions in construction" that ought to be reasonably made by railroads and street railroads. The order here was that the company apply to the
city of St. Louis "within 30 days ... for the necessary franchises, permits and
authority . . . to construct all the following sections of track . . ." After getting franchises the tracks were to be laid within a certain time. The supreme
court held this order void, first, on the rather puzzling ground that this is a
conditional or permissive order and beyond the power of the Commission to
enter. The idea seemed to be that the Commission could enter only mandatory
orders and conditional orders were void. Second, it held that while section
49 clearly gave power to order additions, such as side tracks, switches, crossovers and terminals, incidental to the operation of the main lines, this does not
include power to order the utility to get a franchise for new extensions. This
seems a wise and sound construction so far as power to compel the utility to
procure a franchise is concerned. But the case did not settle the question
whether the Commission could order extensions where the utility already had
a franchise. One judge in a concurring opinion thought it could not order such
extensions into new territory at all, but could only order switches etc., incidental to its existing lines. But in Oazrk Power and Water Company v. P. S. C. "
136. Missouri Southern Railway v. P. S. C.
(1919) 279 Mo. 484, 214 S. W. 379. This and the
mandamus case above were decided at the same
time. Art. 12, section 12 provides: "It shall not
be lawful in this State for any railroad company
to charge for freight or passengers a greater
amount. for the transportation of the same, for a
less distance than the amount charged for any
greater distance."
These spurs were only a few miles long and had
grades of five and eight per cent respectively, so
that only a geared logging engine could be used
and it could not push over two cars up the 8%a
grade. Without doubt the spurs were operated
at a heavy loss, which had to be borne by the
rest of the line. It is a case where the short haul
clause operates rather harshly.
137.

R. S. 1919, § 10425 (5).

138. (1916) 270 Mo. 429, 192 S. W. 958,
198 S. W. 872.
139. See the discussion of Franchise and
Contract Limitations, supra.
140. R. S. 1919, § 10458.
141. (1920) 287 Mo. 522, 229 S. W. 782.
This seems a power which might be subject to
abuse. In this case for example, while if fifty
consumers took current 'at the high rate of
fifteen cents, there seemed a possible profit
on the investment, yet the town was so small,
there was hardly reasonable assurance that half
would continue and there is always doubt as to
the future of such a village. It is probable the
court was influenced by the fact agents of the
company had so aroused hopes that fifteen
houses had been wired before the company
announced its decision not to construct the
line.
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an electric company was ordered to extend its lines a mile to the town of Diamond, a town of one hundred homes., on condition that at least fifty customers
would obligate themselves to take curfent at 15 cents per kilowatt, with a minimum charge of a dollar and a half per month. Eighty citizens promptly so
obligated themselves. On appeal it appeared that the companyliad franchises
for all highways in the county. This being the case the court held there was
merely the question whether the extension was reasonable under the evidence,
and it held the order was reasonable, since there seemingly would be a reasonable profit on the investment, and the town was growing quite rapidly. Thus
it seems that the Commission has the power to compel reasonable extensions
where the utility already has the necessary franchises.
In Missouri Pacific Railroad v. P. S. C.142 an order requiring the continuance of a Pullman car on certain trains on a branch line from Joplin to Pleasant
Hill was upheld under section 16"9 cf the Act, which gave power as to services
for the "comfort and convenience" of the public, though the court expressed
the opinion that a Pullman now be considered a necessity in proper cases.
Finally in Missouri Pacific Rai!roadv. P. S. C.144 the Commission entered
an order requiring the railroad to continue to maintain team track scales for
weighing grain at Rich Hill. A statute in force when the Act was passed required such scales at every point, where the previous years' shipment of grain
had exceeded 10,000 bushels, and a:s this was the case at Rich Hill, the order
was based on the statutory standard. This the supreme court reversed on the
ground it was the duty of the Commission to find public convenience and necessity based on evidence. In other words it is not bound by this statute any more
than by the rate statute.
5. Approval of Bond Issues
Power to approve all bond issues made by utilities within the jurisdiction
is conferred by various sections of the Act. Sections 55 to 57145 confer such
power as to railroads and street railroads while section 63 imposes heavy penalties for disobedience. The Union Pacific Railroad Company, a Utah corporation, having six-tenths of a mile of main line in Missouri and no interstate
traffic, asked approval of a $31,848,900 bond issue on its whole property
valued at nearly three hundred millions. The Missouri property was valued at
about three millions. The Commission gave its approval with its bill for $10,962.25, being a dollar per thousand on the first million, fifty cents per thousand
on the next nine million, and twenty-five cents per thousand for all over ten
million as provided by section 21.1'16 The company paid under protest, and
appealed to a circuit court alleging among other things unlawful interference
with interstate commerce and that: the fees were unreasonable. The circuit
court reversed the order and fixed the fee at $250, but the supreme court reversed this and sustained the Commission on the ground that the company had voluntarily asked approval, and hence submitted itself to the
jurisdiction of the Commission.147 The federal supreme court ended the matter
by quite properly holding this an unlawful interference with interstate commerce, and that the company had acted under duress, in that it had to apply
142.

(1916) 269 Mo. 634, 192 S. W. 86.

146.

143.

R. S. 1919, § 10425.

147.

144. (1918) 275 Mo. 60,204S. W. 395.
145. R. S. 1919, H 10464-10466.

R. S. 1919, § 10430.

"

Union Pacific Railway Co. v. P. S. C.

(1916) 268 Mo. 641, 187 S. W. 827.

JUDICIAL CONTROL OF PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION

for permission or run the risk of heavy penalties. 118 In the meantime the same
company issued over two million more bonds without asking permission. So,
the Commission sought to enjoin the issue in a circuit court, but without success. It appealSd to the supreme court, but this time the court held that only
companies to which the state had granted special privileges, came within the
Act, and further that the order, if entered, would be unreasonable.' The lat
ter was the ground relied on by the circuit court in the previous case, but that
order did not appear unreasonable to the supreme court. 15o This last decision
preceded that of the federal supreme court. So, now one can safely say this
particular railroad is not subject to the jurisdiction of the Commission.
In Kansas City Railways Company v. P. S. C. 1' there had been a reorganization of the company after a receivership, in the course of which the Commission approved a $28,000,000 bond issue for which it charged fees as provided
in section 21. The company claimed that the case came within a proviso of
that section, that no fee should be charged for issues made for "guaranteeing,
taking over, refunding, discharging or retiring any bond, etc." The court held
the plan here was a purchase by the new company of the properties in the
hands of the receivers, and therefore the issue was not within the proviso, a
decision which is probably sustainable under the circumstances.
The only other bond case is Joplin & Pittsburg Railway Company v. P. S.
C. 11' Section 57151 of the Act forbids the Commission approving an issue of
bonds to cover expenditures incurred more than five years prior to the application for permission. The company here had an open mortgage, made prior to
the passage of the act, under which it had power to issue bonds equal to eighty
per cent of the value of the improvements, on showing net earnings for the
past year of over twice its interest charges. The company brought original mandamus to compel the Commission to approve the issue. The supreme court
held since there was no public policy against such anissue the five-yearlimitatation in the Act was an unlawful impairment of the contract, and granted the
writ."
6 Miscellaneous Cases
In Richards v. P. S. C.11' the only question was whether a switch track
claimed by Richards as private, was in fact dedicated to the public so that it
was under the jurisdiction of the Commission. The Commission's order had
148.
Union Pacific Railway Co. v. P. S. C.
(1918) 248 U. S. 67, 63 L. Ed. 131, 39S. C. Rep. 24.
"On the facts we can have no doubt that the
application for a certificate and the acceptance of
it were made under duress. The certificate was a
commercial necessity ....
The statutes, if appli.
cable, purported to invalidate the bonds and
threatened grave penalties if the certificate was
not obtained." Page 70.
149. P. S. C. v. Union Pacific Railway Co.
(1917) 271 Mo. 258, 197 S. W. 39. As to the
first point the court said: "The purpose of section
54 was to embody in the form of positive law the
general legal principle that the right to control
corporations owing duties to the public was an
incident to the grant to them of special privileges
by the state asserting such authority."
This
seems to form the basis for the future limitation of
the jurisdiction of the Commission as to corporate
securities. Probably some day a difficult case will

arise where the corporation has some small
portion of its property within the jurisdiction
of the Commission.
150. While the Act provides for fees to be
paid the Commission for its services, the sum
total of these fees do not pay half the expenses of
the Commission. In the ten years up to 1922 the
average deficit has been over $82,000 per year.
See 9th and 10th Ann. Rep. 51.
151. (1917) 273 Mo. 173, 201 S. W. 74.
152. (1921) 289 Mo. 452, 233 S. W. 388, 833.
153.
R. S. 1919, § 10466.
I54. Blair, J., dissented on the ground that
the Commission had no power to approve this
issue of bonds at all, but the company had the
right to issue them without such permission. The
majority opinion is to the effect the approval must
be given by the Commission, and the Company
must have such approval.
155. (1922) 293 Mo. 625, 239 S.W. 838.
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recognized it as a public switch. The supreme court sustained the order on the
ground there was sufficient evidence of an implied dedication to the public to
sustain the order. A circuit court had reversed the order of the Commission.
Section 64,i 6 of the Act provides that "Whenever the Commission shall
be of the opinion that a common carrier, railroad corporation'i or street railroad corporation is failing or omitting, or about to fail or omit to do anything
required of it by law or by order or decision of the Commission ...it shall direct the general counsel of the commission to commence an action or proceeding in any circuit court.., by way ofmandamus or injunction." Thecommission entered an ex parte order by which it directed suit to be begun against the
Missouri Pacific Railroad, to compel it to furnish cars for shipment of ties between certain points on application. Judge Garesche of the St. Louis circuit
court, where the suit was started, issued a restraining order, and ordered the
company to appear in ten days and show cause. The Company applied for a
writ of prohibition in the supreme court. 157 This court granted the writ, holding (contrary to the Company's contention) that no hearing before the Commission can be required under section 64;ss but it also held that the remedy in
section 64 is exclusive, and a circuit court, in such proceeding, cannot issue
restraining orders or temporary injunctions, but the case must be heard on its
merits as promptly as may be.6 9
In State ex rel. Electric Company of Missouri v. 4tkinson, 6° the Commission granted to the Western Power and Light Company, a permission to operate a light and power business in Maplewood, though the Electric Company
of Missouri was already operating there. The circumstances were unusual in
that the latter company had very high rates, bought all its current, and did
only a small part of its total business in Maplewood. The other company
offered very much lower rates and the Commission decided to grant it permission, notwithstanding it would result in competing companies operating in
the same city. This order the supreme court affirmed, though it asserted the
usual policy was to substitute regulated monopoly for competition, but here
the record justified the Commission.
Other cases of little importance for our 8purposes, in which the Commission
was concerned, are given in the footnote)
7. Evidence and Procedure
Section 24 provides:162
"All hearings before the commission or a commissioner shall be governed by rules to be adopted and prescribed by the commission. And in all
investigations, inquiries or hearings the commission or a commissioner
shall not be bound by technical rules of evidence. No formality in any
156.

R. S. 1919, §10473.

157. Missouri Pacific Railroad v. Garcsche
(1918) 274 Mo. 74,202S. W. 40U.
sinco the
158. This contention seems foolish
act merely gives the Commission discretion to
decide when suit shallbe started. The mcrits
must necessarily he iiigaeed in the circuit court.
159. This conclusion is based on construction
of the whole section. It provides how the suit
shall be started, how long the defendant shall
have to answer, what form the judgment shall be,
and further provides the court shall proceed
immediately without formality or teodnical
pleadings.

160. (1918) 275 Mo. 325, 204 S. W. 897.
The opinion of the court indicates such an order
can be justified only under very unusual circumstances.
161. Myron Green Cafeterias Co. v. Kansas
City (1921) 293 Mo. 519, 240 S. W. 132; P. S. C.
v. Roach (1914) 256 Mo. 669, 165 S. W. 703;
C. M. Fq St. P. Ry. v. P. S. C. (1916) 269 Mo.
63, 189 S. W. 377; Missouri Valley Realty Co. v.
Cupples Light, Heat and Power Co., (1917) (Mo.)
199 S. W. 151; Kirksville v. Hines (1920) 285 Mo.
233, 225 S. W. 950; Hull. Chicago Great Western
Ry. Co. (1916) (Mo. App.) 185 S. W. 1155.
162. R. S.1919, § 10433.
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proceeding nor in the manner of taking testimony.., shall invalidate any
order, decision, rule or regulation made, approved or affirmed by the commision."
The Commission has made its own rules. No case has yet arisen involving
the competen y of evidence admitted in a hearing. As above stated, in order
to secure a review, a motion for a rehearing before the commission must be
made, and in this motion the applicant must set out the ground or grounds of
his objections to the order, and a failure to state such objections constitutes
a waiver of them.163 In other words only those grounds so stated can be urged
on review in the court.
Perhaps the following provision prevents some objections to evidence that
might otherwise be made: Section 109 provides:104
"A full and complete record of all proceedings before the commission or
any commissioner on any formal hearing had, and all testimony shall be
taken down by a reporter appointed by the Commission, and the parties
shall be entitled to be heard in person or by attorney. In case of an action
to review any order or decision of the commission, a transcript of such
testimony, together with all exhibits or copies thereof introduced and all
information secured by the commission on its own initiative and considered by it in rendering its order or decision, and of the pleadings, record
and proceedings in the cause, shall constitute the record of the commission." . . .
Thus the certification of the Commission to its record would include
the assertion that in such record was all the evidence and information on which
it acted, a thing which might be difficult to assert in some cases, but after
such certification, the court can assume it is true. At any rate there has been
n'o difficulty so far. There is some discussion of procedure in M. K. & T. Ry. v.
P. S. C.165 the Pilot Grove train stop case, discussed above.
8. Orders Affirmed and Reversed
Forty-three cases have involved the validity of orders entered after hearings. Thirty-one have been affirmed by the state supreme court and twelve
reversed.oo Four affirmed by the state supreme court have been reversed by
the federal supreme court.",7 In addition, the enforcement of rate orders have
been injoined temporarily by the federal courts in five cases, one injunction
being subsequently dissolved by the supreme court.
Of the twelve cases reversed by the state court, the Buffurn Telephone
Company case and the Danciger& Company case were cases where the ground
of reversal was that the companies involved were not public utilities. Perhaps
the Commission should have come to this conclusion in the first place. In
Mo. So. Ry. v. P. S. C. the first passenger rate case, in the Southwest Missouri
163. Lusk v. P. S. C. (1918) 277 Mo. 264,
272-3, 210 S. W. 72; Mo. Pac. Ry. v. P. S. C.
(1916) 269 Mo. 634,192 S. W. 86.
164. R. S. 1919, § 10520.
165. (1918) 277 Mo. I. c. 192, 210 S. W. 386.
166. Buffum Telephone Company v. P. S. C.,
note 15 supra; Danciger & Company v. P. S. C.,
note 16; Lusk v. Atkinson, note 50; Wabash
Railway Company v. P. S. C., note 51; Mo. So.
Railway Co. v. P. S. C., note 68; Southwest Mo.

Railway v. P. S. C., note 84; Southwest Bell TeL
Company V. P. S. C., note 98; A. T. E9S. F. Ry. v.
P. S. C., note 116; Mo. Pac. Ry. Co. v. P. S. C.,
note 118; C. B. & Q. Ry. Co. v. P. S. C., note 48;
Joplin & Pittsburg Railway Company v. P. S. C:,
note 152.
167. Southwest Bell Telephone Company v.
P. S. C., note 93; Lush v. P.' S. C., note 122;
St. L. & S. F. Ry. Co. v. P. S. C., note 124;
Union Pat. Ry. Co. v. P. S. C., note 147.
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Railways case, and in Missouri P:ificRailway v. P. S. C. the Commission considered it had no power to modify the respective state statutes which stood in
the way of granting relief. In these three cases its course was quite proper, as
the question of construction was only for the court. 68 In the Joplin Pittsburg
Railway Company bond issue case, the question as to whether r.e language of
the Act should prevail over the contract provision in the prior mortgage was a
very difficult one, and one feels like commending the ,Commission for adhering
to the language of the Act, rather than finding that such language impaired
the obligation of the contract where the question was difficult to say the
least.i 69 One cannot say the same in United Railways Company v. P. S. C.
where it undertook to have the company secure a franchise from a city.
This decision was an overconstruction of the Act. The interchange track order
in C. B. &! . Ry. v. P. S. C. is probably only equalled in unreasonableness by
one of the orders enjoined by the federal courts. As to the train stop orders,
one of which was reversed by the state court, and two others by the federal
supreme court, 110 one can only say the record of the Commission is at its worst
in this type of cases. One might class with these cases the Wabash Railway
case, 17' where the construction of a station was ordered, and the A. T. & S. F.
Ry. case 72 where the order was to relieve the travelling salesmen of excessive
storage charges over Sunday. The charge for fees in the Union Pacific Railway bond case was in strict accord with the language of the Act. 173 There seemed no construction of the language on which a lesser charge could be made.
For this order the Commission can be justified. As to the Southwest Bell
Telephone case the order showed she tendency shown in all rate orders to
undervalue the property. This is due largely to the fact that the Commission
relied chiefly on reproduction cost or actual cost before the war in making
valuations. This same tendency existed during the long periods of rising costs
following the war, as to most of the utility Commissions throughout the country
Since the supreme court decision in this cage,
there will probably be little
74
further difficulty in Missouri on this account.
As to the reversals by the federal supreme court the Southwest Bell Telephone case, the most important, has been sufficiently discussed. Two others
were the train stop orders affecting interstate trains, and the fourth case was
the Union Pacific bond fee case.
Two of the orders involved in the federal injunction cases, if we are to
take the statements in the opinions of the court, are undoubtedly bad orders,
one of them particularly so.", Perhaps the court was justified in the other
168. Such a Commission is not to be expected
to seemingly assume the power to abrogate state
Statutes. The action of the Commission in these
cases was proper.
169. The Act in so many words gave power to
approve bond issues for betterments only when
made within five years. Here was an application
for an issue for betterments many of which were
over five years past, but the company was witHn
the terms of its mortgage made before the Act
went into effect. No one but the supreme court
can know whether or not the obligation of such a
contract could be impaired by the Act. The
Commission followed the language of the At.
This was proper for it should not assume to
declare a portion of the Act void as to this mo:rtgage.

170. These cases are Mo. Pac. Ry. v. P. S. C.,
note 118; Lusk v. P. S. C., note 122, and St.
L. E9 S. F. Ry. Co. v. P. S. C., note 124.
171.
Note 5i.
172. Note 116.
173. Notes 146 and 147. The Act was specific
as to the fees to be charged. Under its language
it seemed either the full fee was to be charged or
nothing. The fault was of the legislature. It was
not the business of the Commission to attempt
by construction to find a way to correct the Act.
That was for the Supreme Court, but it seemingly
saw no way to do it.
174. See cases cited in note 101. 175. The order in Joplin El Pittsburg Ry. Cs.
s. P. S. C., note 108, seems indefensible.
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two cases but it is not so clear. Landon u. P. S. C. 17 1 did indirectly involve some
orders of the Commission and these were enjoined by the federal court, but
the injunction was dissolved by the federal supreme court. So, the orders
stood. Whether they were reasonable or unreasonable did not appear.
Of the rewrsals above we may say that at least five of the orders were
proper orders for the Commission to enter. If anything it has been too ready
to attempt to extend the Act to cover a wide area. It should in matters of
construction stick pretty close to the language, where that seems clear, and
permit the supreme court to make the extensions. The rest of the reversed
orders should not be excused, but some of them involved difficult questions of
law on which courts might well differ. About half of the orders named were
clearly not to be commended or excused.
9. Conclusions
The most striking thing to be noted is the attitude of the supreme court
toward the Act and toward the Commission. As to the Act the supreme court
has from the first insisted on liberal construction to enable it to be effectively
administered, and on the whole, one can find little to criticize in its construction so far. As to the Commission, the court at first adopted a policy of watchful waiting. It seemingly desired to see if this new agency was worthy of confidence,-if it could be trusted with such important powers. It seems that the
the Commission has won the confidence of the court, and it is not too much to
say that it has deserved such confidence.
Perhaps the Commission is the most active agency in the state. It has
exhibited great energy and in its operations has probably come closer to the
people in general than any other state agency. There are very few people in
the state whose pocket books have not been affected by its activities, and
they are well aware of it, too. The evidence at its hearings having almost always
been taken locally and reports were always fully published in local papers.
Within the space of ten years the Commission has built up a system of
handling the great volume of business coming before it. It is authorized by the
Act to make rules for procedure at hearings. It has orderly and regular procedure at such hearings, and all interested parties have full opportunity to be
heard. It publishes its important orders together with its opinions, and these
now make up twelve good sized volumes. Many of these opinions contain
long discussions of the law citing decisions of the Commission, of the state
courts, and of other state and federal courts. In short its procedure and its
opinions are very like those of a court. In fact it is a court, and not purely an
administrative body as the supreme court insists, at least while engaged in
formal hearings. At other times it acts as an administrative body.
A tendency to be swayed by local pressure and local opinion has been
more or less marked. Probably it is less susceptible to such influences than
the circuit courts of the state. It must be remembered that nearly all its formal
hearings involve matters likely to arouse such pressure in some locality, while
only a few cases which come before the local courts are of such character.
On the whole, while its record is far from perfect, it has proved itself a
very energetic and earnest body, and has made a success to a reasonable degree at least. It certainly represents a vast improvement over the state of
affairs that prevailed prior to its creation.
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176. Note 106. Some orders of the Commission were incidentally involved in this case.
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